Early parliamentary elections will be held in Bulgaria on 19 April to elect a new prime minister. They are the result of a wave of protests that broke out in December 2025, leading to the resignation of the government. It is the eighth time that Bulgaria has gone through the electoral process since 2021. These elections reveal the deadlock in the Bulgarian political system, linked to shaky coalitions and the weariness of Bulgarians toward a political scene perceived as rigged and corrupt. However, the new political force led by former president Rumen Radev, a popular figure characterised by his involvement against corruption and his conciliatory attitude toward Moscow, appeared in the latest polls as the front-runner in the next elections.[1]
Since 2009, political life in Bulgaria has been dominated by the liberal-conservative party “Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria” (GERB). Founded by Boyko Borisov, the party managed to hold its grip on power through coalitions, especially with the “Movement for Rights and Freedoms” (DPS), a political force led by Delyan Peevski and traditionally a defender of the interests of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The opposition was structured around the “Bulgarian Socialist Party” (BSP), successor of the former communist party of Bulgaria. However, tensions were growing over the intertwined relations between political, business, media elites and the judiciary. This network of shady relations is described in Bulgarian as zadkulisie, meaning behind-the-scenes.[2] In 2020-2021, the country faced popular unrest. The turning point was a series of scandals revealing the level of corruption in the country and the permanent clashes between the Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and the President Rumen Radev. The latter accused Borisov and other oligarchs of being responsible for the systemic corruption in the country.[3] In June 2020, the Prosecutor’s Office raided the Bulgarian Presidency’s offices and detained two advisors of the president.[4] This led to popular protests in support of Radev and the resignation of Borisov. Even if GERB remained the most important political force in the country after the events, the party faced trouble keeping its supremacy and had to deal with an increasingly unsteady coalition, leading to a succession of protests, dissolutions and snap elections.
Through the crisis, new political forces emerged on both sides of the political landscape.[5] The opposition coalition “We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria” (PP-DB) was created to challenge the supremacy of GERB and promote a pro-European and anti-corruption agenda. On the other hand, the party Revival (Vazrazhdane) promoted a nationalist ideology oriented toward Moscow. In December 2025, a new wave of protests erupted in the country. Over 100,000 participants protested in the streets.[6] Led by the opposition coalition (PP-DB), the protesters were initially opposed to the government’s draft budget law before demanding a true change of power. Critics targeted former prime minister Boyko Borissov, who is still at the head of the GERB and Delyan Peevski, leader of the DPS-NN,[7] a media tycoon under UK and US sanctions.[8] As a result of weeks of demonstrations in Sofia, the prime minister from GERB, Rosen Zhelyazkov, resigned on 11 December. President Rumen Radev called for an alliance between GERB, PP-DB, and APS to govern the country, but negotiations were unsuccessful.[9] Then he decided to resign on 20 January to prepare himself for the next elections. On 2 March 2026, he created his own party “Progressive Bulgaria” (PB), a coalition of left-wing parties gathering former members of the socialist party BSP.[10]
Since March, the PB has appeared as the most influential political force for April's election, keeping high voting intentions above the traditional GERB. Latest polls granted 29.4 per cent of the vote to Rumen Radev and 20.7 per cent to Borisov through the GERB.[11] Other principal political forces remain the PP-DB, DPS-NN and Vazrazhdane. The EU has shown concerns about the results of these elections. The GERB was known for its pro-EU stance, which didn’t prevent Bulgaria from maintaining cordial relations with Moscow before the war in Ukraine.[12] However, Rumen Radev is a former Air Force officer who has endorsed a pro-Russian stance and openly criticised Bulgaria’s help to Ukraine. Thus, EU observers fear two threats to the incoming elections: institutionalised local corruption and Russian interference.
Concerning corruption, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) deployed a mission to supervise the proper conduct of elections. In its February report, the agency reported the long-standing practice of vote buying in vulnerable communities, reinforcing the mistrust of citizens towards the electoral process.[13] This echoes the last elections of October 2024, where the Constitutional Court had to force the Central Election Commission (CEC) to recount some votes and reallocate them as inaccuracies were spotted between the results of polling stations and the results claimed by the CEC. Therefore, 17 MPs saw their mandates revoked and reallocated.[14] The other persistent issue is the media regulation in Bulgaria. Campaigning online and by third parties is not regulated. Moreover, social networks are not considered media platforms by law and face no regulations concerning the broadcasting of campaign content.[15] Therefore, it opens a large breach for disinformation.
This lack of media control is therefore considered a breach of Russian interference during the elections. Bulgaria, like other European countries, is a target for the Russian disinformation agencies through the Portal Kombat network.[16] A network of interconnected websites relays the Russian narrative on the Bulgarian political landscape. Some websites like Pogled Info play the role of a hub, republishing and translating articles from sanctioned Russian entities.[17] The creation of Russian mushroom websites and social media floods the Bulgarian media space, creating the illusion of a large shared consensus.[18] The narratives pushed forward concern the responsibility of Ukraine in the war, the NATO threat to international security or the lack of values of the EU. On a smaller scale, parallels have been made by marginal Bulgarian nationalists who took up the Russian claims about the fake identity of Ukraine as a nation and applied them to the case of North Macedonia.[19]
However, despite undeniable cultural ties with Russia and well-documented foreign interference, Bulgaria pursues its own path in the Atlanticist and EU strategic and economic framework. This double stance is underlined by polls and national surveys. A study carried out by the NGO GLOBSEC in April 2024 on a sample of 1000 Bulgarians revealed interesting data about Bulgarian public opinion. The report claimed that 71% of respondents had favourable views of UE, while 56.4% think that Russia poses no threat to Bulgaria and 46.7% that the West and Ukraine are to blame for the oppression of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine.[20] Nevertheless, links with the West seemed to have strengthened through the years and especially since the beginning of the large-scale war in Ukraine. Energetic facilities once controlled by Russian companies, like oil terminals or the Belene nuclear power plant project, have been revoked.[21] Finally, in the middle of the political crisis, on the first of January 2026, Bulgaria became the 21st country to adopt the euro currency. The country has also shown its support towards Ukraine, condemning the Russian invasion. Thirteen aid packages have been sent to Ukraine since 2022, including ammunition and equipment like man-portable air-defence systems and anti-aircraft missiles.[22] On 30 March 2026, the two countries signed a ten-year defence agreement including joint production of weapons.[23]
This pro-Ukrainian stance is likely to be challenged by Rumen Radev if he wins the upcoming elections. During his public statements, he repeatedly criticised the support to Ukraine, qualifying the recent defence agreement as increasing risks to Bulgarian national security.[24] Radev also fustigated EU interference in the elections, taking into account the scenario in Romania where the victory of the right-wing candidate Calin Georgescu in 2024 was cancelled by the Romanian Constitutional Court. He sees EU allegations of Russian hybrid warfare in Bulgaria as an attempt to undermine his legitimacy if he gets elected.[25]
Therefore, the most likely scenario for 19 April appears to be the victory of Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria party (PB). His victory will most certainly mean a decrease in Bulgarian help to Ukraine and a more conciliatory attitude toward Russia. Moreover, under his presidency, Bulgaria could block EU resolutions regarding loans to Ukraine, like Viktor Orbán used to do during his mandate. However, it is unlikely that Radev will get a majority strong enough to rule alone without the consent of other political forces. Therefore, he will have to look for compromises and moderate his stance, especially about his pro-Russian orientation. Among the parties that are likely to pass the 4% vote threshold to enter parliament are the classical duo GERB (Borisov) and DPS (Peevski), long-term opponents of Radev. If an agreement with them seems essential to govern, it will tarnish Radev’s legitimacy as a fighter against oligarchs and corruption. PP-DB is a significant group but its pro-European view doesn’t match Radev’s permanent criticism of the EU and Ukraine. Finally, the pro-Russian nationalist party Revival might get along with PB policy, but they are the less important force in the parliament and might attract Radev’s electorate base if he moderates his stance toward Moscow. Thus, the main stake will be the creation of a stable coalition which won’t be an easy task regarding the political fracture of the Bulgarian landscape. If Radev’s victory isn’t significant enough, the newly elected prime minister will be forced to form another unsteady coalition, leading to potential new dissolutions or snap elections and a Bulgarian political crisis far from being resolved.
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