On November 27, 2025, Montenegro’s police launched the operation “Luhansk” to arrest foreign mercenaries operating in its territory.[1] Twelve men were arrested, and searches carried out by the police at their homes revealed foreign documents and uniforms, as well as large amounts of money, weapons, and ammunition. The main target of the operation was Danko Savić, a former member of the Yugoslav People's Army and a man alleged to have participated in the fights in the Donbas on the Russian side between 2023 and 2025. Photos shared by the police in Montenegrin daily newspaper Vijesti revealed the presence of Russian symbols “Z” and “V”[2] and uniforms with the two-headed eagle of Russia.[3] But among the rifles and guns were laying sabers and papakhas, traditional elements of the Cossacks. In fact, Danko Savić is more than the head of a traditional mercenary group, an ataman who has served in the Balkan Cossack Army in Serbia,[4] and a founding member of the Montenegrin Cossack Brotherhood since 2021.[5]
One may wonder why horsemen and warriors from the steppes would have found their way to the mountains of Montenegro, far from their homeland. But instead of being a fixed image of the past, Cossacks are more alive than ever, and their influence stretches far beyond the borders of Russia. Danko Savić is not the first one to claim a Cossack identity. The development of Cossack organisations in the Balkans is a trend that can be traced back to the wars that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Despite his arrest, it is clear that others will follow his path.
This paper aims to retrace and explain the presence of Cossack organisations in the Balkans. It will address the rebirth of Cossack groups in Russia at the end of the USSR, their arrival in the region during the Yugoslav war, and the evolution of these groups from spontaneous mercenary bands to well-structured organisations. The second part examines three hypotheses to explain the emergence and development of Cossack organisations in the Balkans: their use as instruments of Russian foreign influence, their role as defenders of Orthodoxy, and the importance of the “Russo-Serbian brotherhood” rooted in the historical legacy of the Graničari.
I) A brief introduction to Cossack history
It is not in the scope of this paper to retrace the detailed history of the Cossacks, but before discussing the Cossacks' presence in the Balkans, it is important to identify key features of Cossacks and Cossack organisations. The Cossacks were semi-nomadic peoples that appeared during the 15th century in the steppes of the Black Sea in today’s Ukraine and Southern Russia. Their origins remain debated by modern historians, but all the theories can be divided into two major trends. The first one claims that the Cossacks are the result of an assimilation between Slavic and Turkic peoples living in the area after the Mongol invasion led to the collapse of the Kyivan Rus’. Its defenders refer to the etymology of the Turkic word “qazaq”, which means fugitive or free man, and their similarities with other Turkic tribes. The second main theory is that the Cossacks were mainly peasant communities composed of people fleeing the serfdom of Muscovy by moving to the south, where no great power had assertive control over the region. However, these two theories may be combined, as the development of Cossack communities was a long-term process rather than a spontaneous creation.[6]
The Zaporizhian Cossacks and the Don Cossacks were among the first communities to emerge and to form military and political centres.[7] Afterwards, other groups were created, such as the Terek or the Kuban. Cossacks living in the territories that would fall under the control of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were organised by the creation of a register. Some Cossacks were registered and were used by the Polish princes as “official mercenaries” with allocated privileges. Most of them remained unregistered with semi-autonomy inside the Commonwealth.[8] On the Russian side, the State regulated their activity over the years, exercising increasing control over Cossack affairs, especially with the nomination of their atamans. During the period of the Russian Empire 1721-1917, the Cossacks were organised under territorial armies (Vojsko), with specific rights and obligations in Russian society. Throughout their existence, the Cossacks had ambiguous links with Moscow. They acted as mercenaries and border guards for the Russian state but also represented a permanent source of revolt against central authority.[9] They played a key role in the colonisation of Siberia or the Caucasus and during the Napoleonic Wars before seeing their importance gradually decrease.
Amid the turmoil of the Russian Revolution of 1917, most Cossacks joined the White forces, with whom they shared broadly conservative values, although some sided with the Reds as Soviet-Cossack regiments were created in 1918.[10] On January 24, 1919, the Soviet authorities released a document calling for massive terror and massacre of rich Cossacks.[11] This was the beginning of the policy of “De-Cossackization”, which classified Cossacks as hostile elements of the revolution and aimed at removing them from society. After the victory of the Reds, the remaining Cossacks fled abroad while those who stayed were repressed and could no longer publicly claim their identity. Despite some timid and occasional revivals in Red Army units, Cossacks ceased to exist during the USSR.
The Soviet repression of the Cossacks is often qualified as a “genocide” by some historians or contemporary Cossack figures who refer to the 24 January document.[12] However, this characterisation has been criticised by another school of Russian historians, who claim that the Cossacks were repressed as a social class and not as an ethnic group.[13] This refers to another long-standing debate regarding the nature of the Cossacks. Do they need to be considered as a People (Narod), with their own culture, history, and customs, or should they be considered as an Estate (Soslovie) with their own rights and obligations inside Russian society? The Russian government also contributed to the debate with the law of 26 April 1991 on “The rehabilitation of oppressed peoples” which qualified the Cossacks as “an ethno-cultural community”.[14] As the question remains open, it should be added that the unity of the different Cossack armies is also debatable. Do the Buddhist Cossacks from Kalmykia form the same ethnic group as the Cossacks from Kuban who are historically closer to Ukraine?[15] Regardless, it was only at the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s that the Cossacks re-entered the public space.
II) Cossack Revival and the Yugoslav War
The revival of the Cossacks was firstly the result of small associations dispatched in Russia. They were military-history clubs composed of historians, military veterans or people interested in the reenactment of military history, historical uniforms, and military units. One of these first associations was the Don Military History Club created in 1986.[16] People with Cossack roots were the most involved in the development of Cossack movements, especially in the south of Russia, but these clubs gathered people from various social classes and origins. National organisations were established in Moscow, and the first divisions occurred between Cossack associations over the role they wanted to play in the new Russian society.
While the USSR was on the verge of collapse, Cossack organisations continued to gather more and more people. They offered a new framework of values that could occupy the place left empty by the fall of the regime. Values of Russian Cossacks differ between associations, but during the 1990s they could be defined by: duty to your country, respect of traditional social values and memory of 20th-century persecution.[17] As they were growing in importance, Cossack associations displayed ambiguous relations toward Moscow. Some Cossacks considered themselves Russian while others promoted a more ethnicist vision of Cossacks. Following this latter trend, independent Cossack states were created in the South of Russia like the Don Cossack Republic in 1991,[18] before the central government managed to retake control of the region. Nevertheless, Cossacks embodied values that proved useful to the new Russian state, such as the promotion of Orthodox Christianity or the defence of the “Russian world” (Russkiy mir). Their involvement during the armed conflicts of the 1990s would generally serve Russian interests.
Former military personnel were numerous among the ranks of the Cossacks. While some organisations were focused on reenactment or basic military training, others were closer to independent paramilitary groups. Their first combat experience was during the Transnistrian war in 1992, where Cossacks of the Black Sea and several Cossack volunteers supported Tiraspol’s regime against Chișinău.[19] Their participation in the conflict wasn’t a decision taken by Moscow, but a spontaneous mobilisation of people who sought to help their “Cossack brothers” and protect the Russian population of Transnistria.[20]
A similar scenario occurred during the Yugoslav wars. Russian volunteers took arms to defend the Serbs and Orthodoxy, or simply out of personal interest. Many paramilitary groups that later became the first Russian PMC (Private military company), like Moran security groups or Redut-Antiterror, have their roots in the Yugoslav war.[21] Cossacks were among the first organised units to participate in the conflict. Alexander Zagrebov, in relation with the Serbian authorities of the city of Višegrad, created the first Cossack unit at the end of 1992.[22] About 50 men from the first Cossack detachment created in Moscow crossed the border in December 1992. They introduced themselves as a folklore and artistic group to explain the presence of Cossack uniforms in their suitcases.[23]
Among them was Victor Zaplatin, one of the creators of the first Cossack detachment and a close collaborator of Zagrebov. Thanks to online memories, it is possible to retrace his motivations and actions throughout the war.[24] He embodies the ethnicist vision of Cossackdom and justifies its involvement by the Cossack role of supporting the Serbian “Slavic and Orthodox brothers.”[25] However, many fighters during the Yugoslav war didn’t have any Cossack roots, even among members of Cossack units.[26] They were overall spontaneous volunteers with diverse motivations who found common ground in supporting the Serbs in their war.
III) The modern development of the Cossacks in the Balkans
The statute of Russian Cossack organisations changed in 1995, by a decree of Yeltsin creating a state register of Cossack associations in the Russian Federation.[27] This was followed by a 2005 law on the state service of the Russian Cossackdom.[28] The state regulation of Cossack movements sought first to reestablish control over disparate and potentially dangerous organisations that may contest the state's monopoly on legitimate violence. The second goal was to promote the vision of Cossacks as a class of soldiers devoted to Russia and reduce the influence of organisations with ethnological views.[29] By assimilating the Cossacks to the Russians, the state could reuse their ideology to serve its interests and at the same time suppress any contestation attempt based on the idea that the Cossacks would be another people forced to live in the Russian Federation. Thus, like the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth centuries ago, Russia established a register of Cossack associations. Registered Cossacks were supported by the state and received public funding to achieve public service, especially policing activities.
Moscow promoted and registered Cossack organisations that were loyal to the state, creating a larger division in the country between registered and unregistered Cossack associations. In 2019, a presidential decree created the All-Russian Cossack Society (Vserossijskoe kazačʹe obŝestvo) which regroups all registered Cossack associations of Russia.[30] This association has been controlled by ataman Vitaly Kuznetsov since 2023. All registered associations are divided into vojsko, also ruled by an ataman. All atamans are elected by a Cossack assembly (krug), but it is the President of the Russian Federation who holds the power to confirm their elections. Today in Russia, registered Cossack organisations are state-controlled structures involved in the war in Ukraine and providing military-patriotic training especially toward the youth.
After the Yugoslav wars, Cossack organisations were also created in the Balkans, but to a lesser extent. They were not just paramilitary units from the 1990s, although former mercenaries have joined the ranks of these associations, but they were closer to the model of national-patriotic groups like the one to be found in Russia at the same period. It is difficult to follow their trail due to the lack of public communications. The oldest publicly known Cossack organisation in Serbia is the stanica,[31] embassy “Svjatosavskaja” of the Central Cossack Army, created in 2011 by decree of the ataman Valery Nalimov.[32] The creation of another Serbian Cossack organisation is pointed out in 2013,[33] while the Cossack Center of St. Peter of Cetinje was created in 2014 in Podgorica. The latter even has a website, which was last updated in 2025.[34] The Cossack organisation "Serbian Cossack Blagovesti" was established in 2013. In a statement published on its website, which is no longer indexed, the Ataman claimed in 2018 that there were more than 30 Cossack stanitsas in Serbia.[35] Many other groups exist or may have existed, but it is not possible to list them all nor to know the number of local people and Russians which are part of these organisations. However, based on public articles mentioning the Cossacks in the Balkans, it appears that they are mainly located in Montenegro and Serbia. Besides, the decree of Nalimov reveals that the Russian Cossacks were directly involved in their creation.
The most publicised event in the development of Cossackdom in the Balkans is the creation of the Balkan Cossack Army in 2016 in Kotor, Montenegro. According to the "Cossack Information and Analytical Center," 26 Cossack delegates from other Cossack centers from the Balkans were present at the ceremony.[36] Victor Zaplatin was unanimously elected supreme ataman of the army. One year later, Viktor Vodolatsky, the former ataman of the Union of Cossack forces of Russia and Abroad (SKVRiZ) issued a decree in February 2017 establishing a local branch in Serbia under the control of an ataman named Dragan Stanojevic.[37] The latter became ataman of the All-Serbian Cossack Union in 2018. The SKVRiZ is a peculiar Cossack organisation in Russia. Unlike other main Cossack Armies, the association is not registered and serves as a hub for unregistered Cossack associations from Russia and Cossack associations abroad. The SKVRiZ notably played an important role during the War in Donbas in 2014, ensuring the coordination of Cossack fighters.[38]
If Cossack organisations are strictly organised in Russia, the article from the Cossack Information and Analytical Center is an interesting source, as it mentions the need to create an All-Serbian Cossack Union due to the rise of multiple Cossack associations and self-proclaimed atamans claiming various titles and ranks. This is the same scenario that occurred in Russia during the 1990s when Cossack organisations appeared sporadically without any control or unified vision of what should be related to Cossackdom. Indeed, there is no public evidence that members of the Balkan Cossack Army are also members of the All-Serbian Cossack Union, nor is there about the nature of the relationship between the two organisations.[39] Nevertheless, it confirms that Serbia is an important hub for Cossacks and numerous organisations currently exist there. Therefore, the Cossack presence in the Balkan steadily increased since the creation of the first known organisations in 2011.
IV) Elements of Russian Hybrid Warfare
A first analysis explaining the development of Cossack organisations in the Balkans lay under the prism of security studies. These groups were often referred to as sleeping agents which could perform hybrid operations below the threshold of open conflict. They have often been associated with other groups such as the Night Wolves bikers,[40] by endorsing pro-Russian rhetoric. Although it is difficult to precisely determine the level of control and coordination that Moscow can exercise over these groups, most leaders of Cossack associations have links with Russian institutions. All atamans of the Cossack Armies in Russia are appointed by the president, and many of them are considered Siloviki (members of the GRU, FSB or other state-security organs). Besides, Cossack organisations have already been used in Russian operations abroad, especially during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Among the “little green men”,[41] and volunteers who seized the peninsula, local Cossack organisations and Cossacks from Russia, especially the Terek Army, were present.[42] Cossacks have also played a role in the conflicts in the Donbas since 2014 and collaborated with other nationalist, pro-Russian organisations abroad. Thus, the Night Wolves were among the guests invited during the creation of the Balkan Cossack Army in 2016, and pictures of them are visible in the dedicated article of the Cossack Information and Analytical Center.[43]
Also in October 2014, a group of Cossacks arrived in Bosnia a week before the elections of the president of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik. Like in 1992, they presented themselves as a folklore group and even danced in the middle of the streets of Banja Luka.[44] This cultural visit was perceived as a Crimea-style operation in case of a potential defeat of Dodik. Local media reported that Nikolai Djakonov was the commander of the Cossack Troops and that he had led an armed Cossack unit participating in the takeover of Crimea. In fact, Djakonov is the current ataman of the SKVRiZ,[45] and confirmed in an interview on the YouTube channel of the Union of Volunteers of Donbas the role of the Cossacks in 2014 in Crimea.[46]As Dodik won the elections, the Cossacks flew back to Russia.
Both Djakonov and Zaplatin are members of the Union of Volunteers of Donbas, an organisation in charge of recruiting volunteer fighters for the separatist republic of Luhansk and Donetsk and Russian MPCs.[47] Viktor Zaplatin is also a member of the Moscow City Cossack Society, a registered Cossack organisation which is part of the Central Cossack Army.[48] The Moscow City Cossack Society also contributed to the mobilisation of fighters in the Luhansk People's Republic.[49] The Balkan Cossack Army and the Veterans Organisation of Republika Srpska, BORS, which also cooperated with the Union of Volunteers of Donbas, signed a friendship charter in Belgrade in early 2018.[50] Thus, despite Zaplatin’s claims that he is contributing to the preservation of the culture, customs and traditions of the Cossacks,[51] the Balkan Cossack Army appears as a hub for coordinating pro-Russian organisations across the Balkans and recruiting volunteers willing to join Russian paramilitary groups.
The largest “false flag” operation in the Balkans alleged to have been conducted by Russia might have been in Montenegro during the 2016 general elections. A Bellingcat investigation revealed that conspirators from Russia, Serbia and Montenegro planned a Coup attempt to change the geopolitical orientation of the country.[52] Back then, Montenegro had strained relations with Russia over the willingness of the country to join NATO.[53] It is not possible to clearly identify what role the Cossacks played during these events. Some actors suspected to have been involved in the attempted coup had contacts with Zaplatin or other Cossacks, but no direct involvement of Cossack organisations has been openly established.
IV) Defenders of Orthodoxy
A second approach is to consider the religious prism and the importance of Orthodoxy for Cossack associations. Since the beginning, these groups have displayed strong ties with the Russian Orthodox church by preaching similar values. This is especially embodied by the quote which can be found on the website of many Cossack organisations: “A Cossack without faith is not a Cossack”, (Kazaka bez very — ne kazak). In 2010, the Russian Orthodox Church created a Synodal Committee for Interaction with the Cossacks. The Patriarch Kirill has often expressed positive views on the development of Russian Cossacks. During the First Great Congress of Cossack Confessors in 2013, Kirill clearly expressed his view about Cossackdom. Rejecting the ethnicist approach, he claimed that the Cossacks were “a way of life”.[54] In a more recent open letter to the ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society, he called the Cossacks the living shield of orthodoxy, praising their role in the “special military operation”.[55]
This link with orthodoxy is also clearly visible in the Balkans, as metropolitans and other church representatives are often present during Cossack ceremonies. In 2012 in Sofia, a Cossack organisation was created directly in the crypt of the Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker of Myra, affiliated to the Russian Orthodox Church. Archimandrite Philip, former representative of the Patriarch of Moscow in Bulgaria, oversaw the ceremony. The Cossack society is presented as a local branch of the Great Don Army.[56]
Montenegro is again the most interesting case study regarding converging interests between the Church and the Cossacks. The most influential Church in Montenegro is the Serbian Orthodox Church. From 1990 to 2020, its representative was Amfilohije, Metropolitan Bishop of Montenegro and the Littoral. During his rule, Amfilohije managed to develop the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church through compromise and political alliance with the government. When the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS), led by Milo Đukanović, broke with Belgrade and proclaimed Montenegro’s independence, Amfilohije remained silent and didn’t condemn the event. This tacit support of the DPS served the development of the Serbian Orthodox Church as both sides had mutual interest in cooperation.[57] An opposition to Amfilohije emerged when, in 1993, an autocephalous Montenegrin orthodox church (CPC) rejecting Belgrade’s spiritual authority was created. But this self-proclaimed autocephalous church never managed to get the recognition of Constantinople or other orthodox Churches, nor to challenge the domination of Amfilohije in Montenegro.[58]
Amfilohije always kept good relations with Moscow and sought help from the Russian orthodox church in his quarrel with the CPC. In 2009, after a statement from the CPC regarding the seizure of Serbian churches, Amfilohije called Moscow for help and Cossacks from the Great Don army were planned to be sent to the Cetinje Monastery in Montenegro.[59] However, the Montenegrin government condemned the initiative and there is no evidence that the Cossacks finally ended up protecting the Church.[60] Amfilohije opposed Montenegro’s accession to NATO and publicly cursed the one who dared to betray Russia.[61] He led a large wave of protests in 2020 against a DPS’s law proposal targeting the Serbian Orthodox Church with the support of Russia. However, the participation of Cossacks during these events is not confirmed, despite Amfilohije’s close ties with Russian nationalist groups and the Russian Orthodox Church.
After his death in 2021, he was replaced by Joanikije Mićović who followed the same guideline regarding Russia. If the Cossacks share the same values as the Orthodox Church, their involvement remains essential in the field of ceremonies and commemorations. Unlike the situation in Russia where registered Cossacks can legally perform policing missions, initiatives like the protection of the Cetinje Church have an important political cost. Balkan states won’t accept that foreign entities performed military activities in the name of God on their territories. Nevertheless, the fact that Amfilohije called for Russian Cossacks and not one of numerous local Serb or Montenegrin nationalist groups underlines the proximity between the two worlds. Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches have close views regarding the values attached to the concept of “orthodox world”. Values embodied by Cossack organisations that portray themselves as protectors of orthodox traditions.
V) The Russo-Serbian brotherhood and the Graničari heritage
The last chosen analysis to explain the rise of Cossack groups consists of questioning the specific relationship between Russia and Serbia. Even if Cossack organisations are widely present in the Balkans, most active and documented groups are located in Serbia or Montenegro. Many analyses have already assessed the shared values between the Russian and Serbian far-rights.[62] Both countries have seen the emergence of paramilitary/nationalist groups during the 1990s. If the Russians participated in the wars in the Balkans, the Serbs were among the largest foreign volunteer fighters in Ukraine since 2014.[63] The “Russia-Serbian brotherhood” is often quoted by these groups to justify their proximity and their participation in conflicts. Although money or war-romanticisation sometimes plays an important role in mobilisation above cultural or historical links. Regarding this cultural claim, few analyses have treated the Graničari heritage despite its similarity with Cossackdom.
The Graničari, or Grenzers, were communities of peasants living at the border between the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire. They were composed mainly of slaves who fled the Balkans after the Ottoman conquest. The Grenzers had a special military statute inside the Habsburg Empire and were dispatched in regiments assuring the protection of frontier military districts.[64] It didn’t take long for contemporaries to make comparisons between Grenzers and Cossacks. Both were irregular military troops located in the south of the empire and ensuring the protection of the border for a long period of time against a common enemy, the Turks. The first comparison appeared in the diary of a Russian diplomat, Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy, in 1697-1698 after a trip to the Balkans.[65]
During the 18th century, measures were taken by the Austrian government to reduce the number of Grenzers. At the same time, Russia was conquering the South-East of Ukraine and was looking for colonists to develop its project of Novorossija. Not only could the Grenzers bring their military experience to defend the now most southern part of the empire, but the Russian government believed their settlement would create pro-Russian sympathies among the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire.[66] On 13 July 1751, by a decree of Elizabeth Petrovna, the region of Novoserbia was created in today’s Ukraine to welcome the Serb population. However, the project didn’t last long as ethnic tensions increased between the Poles, the Zhaporizhian Cossacks and the Serbs present in the area.[67] Catherine II put an end to the project in 1764 to reinforce autocratic power in the region. However, the Serbs remained in the region after the dismantlement of Novoserbia, and Serbian landowners retained all their privileges. The Serbs weren’t the only people from the Balkans who joined the region. Long before the 1751 settlement, mercenaries from Southern Europe already joined the Cossack Hetmanate.[68] Also, “Serbs” have to be understood to a larger extent than the modern meaning. It was common for Slavic Orthodox populations from the Balkans to be qualified as Serbs even if they were from a different ethnic group.
The Cossacks and the Grenzers faced a comparable crisis in the 19th century. Both systems provided relatively cheap military defence and manpower, but the privileges and land rights granted to these groups were no longer sustainable for the governments. While Russia updated Cossack regiments, Austria-Hungary decided to disband them to rely on a professional army.[69]
Therefore, it doesn’t appear as a nonsense that this “common history” might be emphasised by the Russian Cossacks to justify their presence in Serbia, especially regarding their current rhetoric challenging the Ukrainian affiliation of Zaporizhian Cossacks. However, in reality, the reference to the Grenzers is marginal in Cossack discourse. Available public documents from Cossacks rarely refer to Grenzers. They rely more often on general claims about the common link between Serbian and Russian Cossacks through Orthodoxy, the Cossacks’ deliverance of the Balkans from the Ottoman yoke or their common criticisms of Western values. Besides, no document attests to the existence of any Grenzers/Granicar organisation in Serbia today. The only confirmed reference is from the Cossack Center of St. Peter of Cetinje in Montenegro.[70] But one occurrence is not enough to claim the influence of the Granicar heritage in the development of Cossack organisations in Serbia, even if many Cossack organisations do not have any website or public record to express their views on the topic.
Conclusion
The Cossack presence in the Balkans gradually evolved from mercenary groups composed of volunteers in the 1990s to structured organisations with cultural, religious and paramilitary activities. Open-source investigations have revealed that under the cover of cultural activities, Cossack organisations have close links with the Kremlin and served as hybrid warfare tools. Their religious affiliation makes them cooperate closely with Orthodox Churches abroad, while the cultural proximity between Serbia and Russia may favour their development in this specific country, despite any references to the Grenzers heritage as a means of legitimation. Given the limited access to sources, this analysis can only be considered a first step towards the study of an almost unexplored group and actor in the Balkans.
Such questions, like the nationality of members in these organisations as well as whether their recruitment relies on the local population or Russian volunteers require field investigation to bring concrete answers. The link between Cossack organisations and nationalist groups like the Chetniks also require its proper analysis. Finally, the diversity of Cossack associations remains little studied. While some organisations are clearly following military and nationalist guidelines, others are promoting historical and cultural ways of life without any (geo)political ambition.
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Web sources :
Cossack Center of St. Peter of Cetinje : https://kozaci.net/rus-index.html
Cossack Information and Analytical Center : https://kazak-center.ru/
Djakonov’s interview, Union of Volunteers of Donbas : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFYKBdnWK0U
Union of Cossack forces of Russia and Abroad (SKVRiZ) : https://skwrz.ru/index/ataman_skvriz/0-17
Moscow City Cossack Society : https://mgko-moscow.ru/
Russian Cossackdom : https://kazachestvo.ru/
Serbian Cossack Blagovesti : https://web.archive.org/web/20240124220601/https://srpskikozaci.rs/
Holy Synod of the Bulgarian orthodox church, Bulgarian patriarchate : https://bg-patriarshia.bg/
Russian orthodox Church, Moscow patriarchate : https://patriarchia.ru/en