A controversial historical figure at the heart of memory conflicts
On January 2nd, 2026, the independent Polish online media Kresy24.PL published a critical article titled “Lviv with Bandera on their lips and torches in their hands. This is how Ukrainians honour their “hero”.”[1] Within the two videos shared in the article, a procession of protesters, some of them wearing military clothes, parades in the streets of Lviv. Escorted by police vehicles, the crowd holds red and black flags, decorated with tridents, among which some blue and yellow flags can be found. Enlightened by torches and red flares, the portrait of the historical figure commemorated on this day appears on some of their banners.
To understand why this event sparked outrage in Polish media, it is essential to understand who Bandera was, what he represents for Ukrainians, Poles, and other cultural, ethnic and religious groups in this region
Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe’s Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult is one of the first academic biographies on Bandera and its cult as well as one of the most in-depth historical accounts existing to this day.[2] The author, born in 1979, is a German-Polish historian whose research focuses on Central and Eastern European history, with an emphasis on nationalism and the Shoah. His works have been the subject of intense controversy. The book on which this essay is based has been badly received by the Ukrainian far-right, but also by some academics and historians. The tensions and criticism brought up by his works were illustrated by his inability to present his work in Lviv during a series of lectures he conducted in different Ukrainian universities in 2012, and his presence in Kyiv led to a riot in front of the German embassy. Nevertheless, Rossolinski-Liebe has received some support in Ukraine, but also from Canada, Germany, Russia, Poland and in the U.S.
Youth, aspiration for independence, and ideological development
Stepan Bandera (1909-1959 ) was born in Eastern Galicia, a region long integrated into the Habsburg Empire and further marked by a strong Polish influence. It was composed predominantly of Ukrainians, alongside a quarter of Poles and a slightly smaller proportion of Jews. This part of Ukraine (which represented only 20% of the country, with the remaining 80% living in the Russian Empire) has been particularly favourable to the development of a national Ukrainian sentiment, from which desires of independence have stemmed. The Ukrainian identity in Galicia and Volhynia was closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, since the Brest Union in 1596.[3] Stepan Bandera’s father, who was also involved in the building of a Ukrainian State, was a Uniate priest himself.
This religious dimension was accompanied by intellectual and historiographical developments. Indeed, Ukrainian nationalism before the Great War was promoted by engaged historians, such as Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (1866-1934), who described Ukraine’s past as being distinct from Russia’s past.[4] Ukrainian national awakening at that time was therefore developed on ethnic, cultural and religious principles as well as on economic ones. After World War I, Ukrainians did not achieve independence, mainly due to the gap between Eastern and Western Ukraine, a national identity still too vague, and the help provided to the Central Powers. In this context, pogroms took place in Ukraine, causing around 50,000 to 60,000 Jewish victims. The anti-Polish feeling increased even more in Eastern Galicia under the Second Polish Republic, due to a polonisation policy and the non-respect of the Little Treaty of Versailles (1919), which guaranteed equality of rights between all cultures and ethnicities in the country. During those years, Ukrainians were living in 5 different States, where they were more or less well treated.
It was in this fragmented political context in 1927 that Bandera, as a High school student in Poland, joined the clandestine nationalist organisation known as the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO).[5] It led, with the merging of other far-right organisations, to the creation of the Ukrainian Nationalists Organisation (OUN)[6] in 1929 Vienna. His obsession with the nationalist cause went as far as to sometimes torture himself in case of an eventual interrogation. Athletic and devoted, he fascinated his social circle, despite having an unstable and sometimes violent character. After completing high school, Stepan enrolled at the Polytechnic University of Lviv from 1928 to 1930, where his involvement in nationalist movements led him to several prison sentences. These considered the Soviets, Jews and Poles as their main enemies since OUN’s goal was to establish a single-party system in a free and ethnically homogeneous Ukraine. The first step of the struggle, which had already begun at the movement’s creation, was the “Permanent Revolution.” The following step, called the “National Revolution,” was supposed to unfold once the masses galvanised.[7]
Career at the OUN and participation in the “Permanent Revolution”
In the early 1930s, terror by assassination, looting, destruction and fires became a form of legitimate struggle against the occupant. In turn, Polish authorities carried out extremely brutal “pacifications.”[8] Shortly after these events, Stepan Bandera, responsible for the organisation’s propaganda in Galicia-Volhynia, rose to become head of the OUN’s Regional Executive in Western Ukraine. The national cause was then fortified by ideological and political currents, inspired by figures like Hitler, considered the ideal fascist leader. In this context, the diaspora already played an essential role in the struggle for Ukraine’s independence. Universities were clusters for the movement where young Ukrainians propagated antisemitic ideas, associating the Jews with the Bolsheviks. Their aesthetics borrowed a lot of elements from communist and fascist propaganda. The use of the term fascist to describe them is still highly debated: while the OUN described itself as a liberation movement, it displayed ultranationalist, antidemocratic, and militaristic characteristics, emphasised ethnic violence, and promoted a cult of war and martyrdom.
The executions by Polish authorities in 1932 of OUN members had been an opportunity for the organisation to frame itself as a group of persecuted people. Churches were also said to have rung their bells in honour of the deceased. This religious support was coupled with a second form of spirituality, with the upholding of emblematic figures from Ukrainian culture.
In 1933, when Bandera became OUN’s homeland executive, the organisation’s members’ radicalisation and militarisation increased. In Eastern Poland, he attempted to raise the peasant masses against the Polish people and authorities. Bandera had a very concrete idea of the Ukrainian nation, specific to Galicia, which was not necessarily understood in Volhynia and even less in the East. He was aligned with a more radical branch than the founders of the movement: he idealised war, which he did not know, and considered the nation superior to religion.
For example, one of his actions was to order the assassination of the Minister of the Interior, Bronislaw Wilhelm Pieracki, on 15 June 1934 in the middle of Warsaw. The assassin first tried to blow himself up along with the politician, but failed, probably due to a technical issue. Nonetheless, this shows the indefectible devotion which animated some members of the OUN, ready to kill themselves for their cause. Following Pieracki’s assassination, 800 OUN members, including Bandera, were arrested. This murder was therefore experienced as a true national tragedy in Poland. A national mobilisation, organised by the State and media, raised Pieracki as a hero and a martyr. Bandera and his accomplices seized this opportunity to expose their demands during the Warsaw and Lviv trials.[9] During the first trial, Bandera was accused of separatism and complicity for Pieracki’s murder, along with eleven other members. Bandera did not give any information away during interrogation processes and did not say a single word in Polish during the entirety of the trial.[10] One highlight of the trial was the first fascist salute, followed by the slogan “Slava Ukraїni!” pronounced by Vira Svientsitska. Bandera was afterwards sentenced to life imprisonment and deprived of his civil rights.
The second trial was animated by similar issues: fascist salutes and slogans were shouted at their arrival at the tribunal and Bandera received the same sentence. The instrumentalisation of these two trials began the ascension of Bandera as a model for parts of the Ukrainian youth and the triumph of fascist ideas, presented as necessary for the liberation of Ukraine. The memory of the trials persists, notably through chants in Ukrainian culture. The media also used the term “Banderists” for the very first time to label the convicted individuals. Stepan was imprisoned until September 13th, 1939, in difficult conditions, punctuated by three hunger strikes. During this period of intense nationalist activism, efforts were made to free Bandera as the OUN intended to place him at the forefront of the movement.
Subsequently, the beginning of the Second World War brought mass violence against Poles by the OUN in Eastern Galicia and in Volhynia. In return, Polish soldiers also committed massacres.[11] In 1940, Bandera proclaimed the Revolutionary Leadership in Cracow. The same year, the organisation split into two concurrent factions: the OUN-B, for Bandera, in opposition to the OUN-M for Melnyk.[12] The two leaders disagreed and accused each other of treason. The conflict between Banderists and Melnykits constituted a leap forward in the Cult of Bandera. The two organisations delegitimised each other, while Bandera became the Providnyk.[13] By this title, similar to the Duce or the Führer, he did not tolerate any political pluralism. The red and black flag (for blood and earth) was adopted, with the salute with the arm raised.
Despite its ultranationalist nature, OUN’s ideology was marked by a form of international strategic cooperation, considering that the destruction of the USSR could only be achieved with Germany’s help and its allies. On Ukrainian ground, the OUN’s goal was still the erasure of every foreign element. Terror was explicitly presented as a legitimate means to achieve this goal. The final purpose being the merging of the State, the nation and the OUN into one entity.
The symbolic, almost spiritual importance that Bandera acquired in the organisation was found even in the integration of new members in the OUN. To join it, it was necessary to pledge allegiance to him and to other central figures of Ukrainian nationalism. This symbolism was accompanied by intense propaganda, rumours and militant funerals during which red and black flags, blue and yellow flags, as well as tridents were raised. The party also started to invest in youth by forming young Ukrainians starting from the age of six. The regime of terror implied the application of the death sentence for economic crimes and the prohibition of assisting wounded enemies
The “National Revolution”, Bandera’s absence and moral responsibility
The “Ukrainian National Revolution” began on June 22nd 1941, at the same time as Operation Barbarossa. The OUN-B's priority was to establish its dominance on the newly conquered Ukrainian ground. When German troops and the OUN-B penetrated Lviv on June 30th 1941, the city counted 160 000 Jews, 140 000 Poles and 70 000 Ukrainians. The Nachtigall battalion, composed of Ukrainians, was nicknamed the “Stepan Bandera battalion” although his face and name were displayed everywhere, Bandera was not present for the proclamation of the Ukrainian State, delegating it to Yaroslav Stetsko.[14]
During the ceremony, the presence of the Greek Catholic clergy members raised questions: if the distinction between religion and nationalism is often blurred, and the cult of Bandera is actively maintained by some Uniate priests during the 20th century, this support is far from being unanimous and systematic. The case of the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky (1865-1944) exemplifies this ambiguous relationship between Ukrainian nationalism and the Greek Catholic Church.[15] Even if he had declared the new government (which has never been recognised by the German State) in accordance with God’s will, he did not support the persecution of minorities. He is even said to have saved more than a hundred Jews and criticised fascist salutes.
From July 2nd onwards, in Lviv, Jews were accused of supporting the Soviets and were held responsible for the mass graves left behind by the NKVD, which was said to have killed between 2,800 and 4,000 people. If most of them were Ukrainian, some were also Polish and Jewish. A series of pogroms then took place, during which the city’s Jewish population was violated and humiliated in a ritualised and systematic manner. Prison courts were places where rapes, executions and tortures were most likely to occur, but it also extended to the street, with the partial contribution of the local Ukrainian population.
Even if we could not truly talk about an official collaboration between the Einsatzkommandos and the OUN-B, it is evident that the objectives of the purges were the same. During the entirety of the war, the massacres were done with similar methods.[16]
After Bandera’s and Setsko’s arrest by the Germans, who did not appreciate their autonomous and uncontrollable nature, the National Revolution continued. The pogroms were said to have killed up to 39,000 people in Galicia. In July 1941, the Ukrainian militia became an auxiliary police force under Himmler’s directive. The organisation was dismantled and its members were tracked down by the Germans. Even though many of them managed to join the police. Moreover, they continued to pledge allegiance to Bandera’s portraits, in ritual ceremonies containing all the symbols preestablished in the Ukrainian nationalist movement. In 1943, OUN-B members were said to have occupied roughly 200 police posts in Volhynia.
The participation of the Ukrainian population in the ethnic purges requires nuance. German sources themselves testified to the difficulty of convincing Ukrainian peasants to partake in the violence. Furthermore, the ideological explanation of their participation also needs to be shaded, as it would seem that much of the violence resulted from economic opportunism.
Bandera’s responsibility in the atrocities committed during World War II in Ukraine was primarily political, ethical and moral. At the end of the war, the OUN-B faced a decline in popularity and its relationships with German authorities were rapidly deteriorating. This could be attributed to the murder of OUN-M’s members. During July and August 1942, Bandera was even detained for some time in Auschwitz. If he enjoyed many favours and was considered a special prisoner in Berlin, Cracow or Sachsenhausen for the remaining duration of his detention, he has been presented in the Ukrainian nationalist narrative as a persecuted and tortured martyr.
A branch of Ukrainian historiography describes OUN-B resistance to the Germans, but the movement in fact often sought their favour. One significant connection between part of the Ukrainian population and the German forces was the creation in 1943 of a Galician Waffen-SS division, for which 80,000 Ukrainians volunteered. Nevertheless, some of those volunteers deserted in the course of this same year, to join the Ukrainian Liberation Army (UVV),[17] soon to be the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).[18] The UPA, serving as the OUN-B’s armed wing with 25,000–30,000 fighters in 1944, was mainly composed of young men whose discipline was enforced through internal terror.
Starting in February 1943, the OUN-B stated that it was fighting both imperialisms: the USSR and Nazi Germany, which started to lose the war. This period marked a turning point in the movement’s communication, which continued to glorify Bandera and pursue ultraviolent nationalism while presenting itself as democratic to improve relations with the Allies. In July 1944, UPA and OUN created the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR) to reinforce their democratic image. An attempt to negotiate with the Polish Armia Krajowa (AK) was even made, but it did not succeed
The total annihilation was indeed presented as the only solution to the Polish population's refusal to leave Volhynia. The first systematic massacres started in March 1943. Similar methods to the Einsatzkommandos against Jews were applied. Acts of extreme sadism were noticed, particularly during local massacres. The total of Polish victims killed by the OUN-UPA from 1943 to 1945 is said to be between 70 000 and 100 000, compared to 10 000 up to 20 000 Ukrainian victims killed by Polish forces, who responded with aggression, plunging the conflict into a spiral of inter-ethnic violence.
World War II: a first step in the history of Bandera’s memory
OUN-UPA members and their sympathisers first started to name themselves “Banderists” during the course of the Second World War, a term also used by their opponents and victims. For Ukrainians, the term could inspire admiration for their devotion to the nationalist cause, but also fear of becoming victims of their terror. From the German point of view, Banderists were sometimes considered as useful tools to apply the “Holocaust”, and sometimes as potential enemies who demanded autonomy for a rival State. The victims of the racist and antisemitic ideology of OUN-UPA, meaning mostly Jewish, Polish and Tsigan minorities, have been associated with Banderists persecutions of unprecedented violence, leaving a festering memorial wound, which only began to heal in the 1990s.
Stepan Bandera became one of the main symbols of Ukrainian nationalism during the first half of the 20th century, and his cult survives to this day. What remains is to understand the complexity of memory politics and their historical, political and ideological dimensions left by Bandera since 1945.
Bibliography
Primary and secondary literature
Desbois, Patrick. The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth Behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews. Translated by C. Spencer. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Dyroff, Stefan. “Minority Rights and Humanitarianism: The International Campaign for the Ukrainians in Poland, 1930–1931.” Journal of Modern European History 12, no. 2 (2014): 216–230.
Plokhy, Serhii. Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the writing of Ukrainian history. Toronto & Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2014.
Portnov, Andrii. Stepan Bandera (1909–1959). In K. Amacher, É. Aunoble, & A. Portnov (Eds.), Histoire partagée, mémoires divisées : Ukraine, Russie, Pologne (pp. 341–351). Lausanne: Éditions Antipodes, 2021.
Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz. Stepan Bandera: The life and afterlife of a Ukrainian nationalist. Fascism, genocide, and cult. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2014.
Tatarenko, Laurent. Une réforme orientale à l’âge baroque : Les Ruthènes de la grande-principauté de Lituanie et Rome au temps de l’Union de Brest (milieu du XVIᵉ–milieu du XVIIᵉ siècle). Rome: École française de Rome, 2021.